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In his 2000 paper, Hookway intends to argue that Fumerton’s 
Principle of Inferential Justification does not have the sceptical 
consequences that Fumerton sees into it. We think Hookway is 
right in holding this. However, after commenting on his main con- 
siderations for this thesis, we shall develop an independent line of 
argument which reinforces the same conclusion. 
1. Fumerton’s Principle concerns justification of inferential be- 
liefs, that is, of beliefs held on the basis of other beliefs or of 
some body of evidence. To recall, the principle is as follows: 
PIJ: To be justified in believing one proposition P on the basis of another 
proposition E, one must be (1) justified in believing E and (2) justified 
in believing that E makes probable P (Fumerton 1995: 36). 
Fumerton contends that, if we accept this seemingly plausible 
principle, the justifiedness of a large number of our beliefs will be 
destroyed or seriously impaired. One way in which the supposed 
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sceptical threat arises is as follows: clause (1) of the PIJ gives rise 
to a regress, the kind of regress which foundationalism has in- 
tended to stop by appealing to noninferentially justified beliefs; 
but clause (2) generates a second regress, a more damaging one. 
Suppose, in effect, that someone believes that E makes probable 
P. Is he justified in believing this? It is unlikely that people have 
non-inferentially justified beliefs about the measure in which cer- 
tain complicated inference patterns make their conclusions prob- 
able. So, the belief that E makes probable P will be inferential 
and depend for its justification on other propositions or evidence. 
Now we have the proposition P‘, namely ‘ E  makes probable P’, 
which is believed on the basis of another proposition or evidence 
E’. To be justified in believing P’ one must, be justified in believ- 
ing E’ and also justified in believing that E’ makes probable P‘ 
(i.e., that E’ makes probable that E makes probable P) .  The re- 
gress seems unavoidable. 
We shall restrict our comment to beliefs about the past. As 
Fumerton suggests, scepticism about our access to the past is 
probably more damaging than, and logically prior to, scepticism 
about the external world. So, let us see how this works when P 
is a proposition about a past fact or event which is believed 
on the basis of memory. P would belong to “an interesting class 
of propositions about the past [which] have this feature: all of 
the propositions making up their evidential base are reports of 
apparent memories; and, it is assumed, they are obtained from 
this evidential base in a similar fashion” (Hookway 2000: 352). 
In our case, then, E is something like ‘I seem to remember that 
P’, where P is the corresponding proposition about the past. 
Am I justified in believing P on that evidential basis? In order 
for me to be so, if we accept the PIJ ,  I must be justified in 
believing E and also in believing that E makes probable P. How 
can I be justified in believing that E makes probable P? Pre- 
sumably (since the step from E to P is not deductively valid) on 
the basis on induction, of other cases in which my seeming to 
remember correlated with the fact I then seemed to remember. 
But this new evidence on the basis of which I believe that E 
makes probable P is made out of propositions about past facts 
or events. And, by clause (1) of the PIJ,  in order for this evi- 
dence to justify my belief that E makes probable P, I must be 
justified in believing that evidence. But, since this evidence is 
made out of beliefs of the kind we started with, we are caught 
in a regress and cannot have justified beliefs about the past on 
the basis of memory. 
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2. Hookway’s strategy against Fumerton, as we see it, is an 
application of his general antisceptical strategy, as presented in 
some of his other writings. In his 1990 book, Hookway acknowl- 
edges his preference for a naturalistic epistemology. An essential 
aspect of his antisceptical strategy is his distinction between local 
and global normative epistemological assessments. Naturalistic epis- 
temology allows for legitimate local normative questions about, 
e.g., the reliability of visual perception in particular circum- 
stances of lighting. According to Hookway, “naturalistic epistemol- 
ogy may prove adequate to our needs if the only normative issues 
that need to be solved are local ones: they concern particular 
methods of inquiry against a firm background of theoretical and 
methodological certainty” (Hookway 1990: 237). Scepticism in- 
trudes when local issues expand into global ones. Once we accept 
the global question, we soon realize that we lack the means to 
answer it. The question itself cuts the grass under our own feet 
and leaves us without defence against the sceptic. 
In this context, Hookway’s antisceptical strategy consists, in part, 
in emphasizing the differences in kind between local and global 
normative issues and in trying to block the expansion of local 
issues into global ones. 
Another feature of Hookway’s approach to scepticism is that, 
according to him, “the challenge of scepticism can be viewed as a 
special case of the free will problem” (Hookway 1990: 215). Scep- 
ticism challenges our rational autonomy as inquirers, preventing 
us from taking responsibility for our cognitive activities and their 
results. This connection between the problems of scepticism and 
free will gives rise to a distinctive, normative conception of justi- 
fication. To say that someone is not justified in his beliefs is to 
imply that he has not acted, epistemically, as a responsible, self- 
controlled agent. 
In his criticism of F’umerton’s position, Hookway emphasizes again 
the difference between local issues, concerning particular conclu- 
sions which are drawn from a salient evidence against a back- 
ground which is not put into question, and global issues, where 
the difference between salient evidence and background vanishes 
and extremely wide classes of beliefs (such as the class of beliefs 
about the past on the basis of memory) are examined. According 
to Hookway, the plausibility of the PIJ derives from its applica- 
tion to the former sort of cases, where it is little more than a plat- 
itude. However, when applied to the latter, this apparent platitude 
becomes a serious threat for the justification of large classes of our 
beliefs. Hookway attempts to block the passage from one sort of 
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cases to the other while emphasizing the difference between them. 
He stresses the fact that the tendency to make broad classifica- 
tions of beliefs goes with a substantive, nonnormative view of jus- 
tification, whereas concrete specific classifications, not allowing an 
unrestricted spreading of sceptical doubts over wide doxastic ar- 
eas, belong with the normative view of justification which he fa- 
vours and we alluded to above. So, on this approach, “we explain 
what it is for a belief to be justifzed by reference to more funda- 
mental notions concerning responsible deliberation and inquiry: a 
belief is justified when it is sustained by evidence and inquiry as 
(in some suitably qualified and reflective sense) it ought to be” 
(Hookway 2000: 362). Hookway opposes this view of justification 
to one (shared by Fumerton) which “views justification as a fun- 
damental epistemic value or norm, one which can receive a sub- 
stantial analysis” (2000: 362). Now Hookway will see the adoption 
of this second stance concerning justification as “a necessary con- 
dition for advancing from the platitudes embodied in the Princi- 
p l e  of Inferential Justzfzcation to the sceptical arguments ...” 
(Hookway 2000: 363), as far as it permits the construction of broad 
doxastic categories on the basis of uniform, very general patterns 
of justification, and, correspondingly, the raising of those global 
epistemological evaluative issues linked to scepticism. 
We are sympathetic with Hookway’s approach, but there may 
be some controversial points in it. Someone like Barry Stroud might 
probably find Hookway’s attempt to block the slide from ordi- 
nary, local issues to global ones unsuccessful. According to Stroud, 
sceptical challenges do not make use of extraordinary, highly and 
implausibly demanding epistemic standards; they rather use, and 
follow naturally from, humble assumptions incorporated in ordi- 
nary, everyday assessments of knowledge claims (cf. Stroud 1984: 
ch. 2). Moreover, Hookway’s criticism rests heavily on his norma- 
tive view of justification and might be put, in question if Fumer- 
ton’s alternative view of justification could be successfully defended. 
Anyway, we are trying to follow a path parallel to Hookway’s and 
to find an independent response to Fumerton’s sceptical argu- 
ment concerning the justification of our beliefs about the past. 
These two paths, however, might eventually join. 
3. As we see it, the sceptical impact of the PIJ depends, among 
other things, on two assumptions, namely that all beliefs that P, 
where P is a memory-based proposition about the past, are infer- 
ential and that the propositions which form their inferential base 
have roughly the form ‘I seem to remember that P’. We shall 
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dispute both assumptions. We think that Hookway concedes too 
much to Fumerton in that he seemingly accepts Fumerton’s con- 
tention that all beliefs about the past are inferential. We are not 
convinced that this is true. Moreover, we shall also dispute the 
claim that our beliefs that P, where ‘P’ expresses a proposition 
about the past, are the result of inferential steps from apparent 
memories (or seemings to remember) that P to P or to beliefs 
that P. We shall contend that we simply do not do such inferences. 
There are inferential beliefs about the past. We sometimes gen- 
uinely infer that something happened or that we did something 
from some piece of evidence. Suppose, for example, that I find, in 
the pocket of an old jacket of mine, a sales ticket from a shop in 
Teruel. On it appears the name and price of a certain article (say, 
a pot of honey). Now I remember I was in Teruel by the time 
indicated on the ticket, but I do not remember having bought 
that article. I still do not remember having done that, but I infer 
that I did from the information contained in the ticket and my 
memory of having been in Teruel. My belief that I once bought a 
pot of honey in Teruel is an inferential belief about the past. 
However, it does not show the inferential pattern indicated in the 
last paragraph. 
Suppose, however, that in seeing the ticket I distinctly remem- 
ber having bought the pot of honey. In this case, the ticket is not 
evidence from which I infer that I bought the honey, but an oc- 
cassion or cause of my remembering. In many cases we just re- 
member that P. So, for instance, while I am writing this, I try to 
recall what I did yesterday and I clearly remember that I gave a 
lecture on the free will problem. Do I infer that I gave that lec- 
ture? Not in the sense in which I infer that I once bought a pot 
of honey in Teruel from the ticket I found in my jacket. True, I 
have vivid memory images of my lecture, of the students who 
were present, of some questions they asked, and so on, but this is 
just remembering my lecture, not evidence from which I infer that 
I gave that lecture. And remembering I gave that lecture is, ipso 
fucto, believing (and knowing) that I did. 
“But,” so the sceptic argues, “might it not be that you had 
those vivid memory images and you did not give that lecture? If 
you say ‘yes’, as you should, then you should not assume that in 
having those images you are remembering your lecture, but only 
that you seem to remember it, and your belief that you did it is 
an additional, not yet justified step”. The answer might go as 
follows. That P may be false does not mean that I merely seem 
to remember. Certainly, if P is false, I do not remember that P, I 
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maybe only seem to remember. But if it is true, I remember that 
P, I do not merely seem to remember. The sceptic will object 
that the truth of P is something I have access to only through 
memory, so I cannot know whether I remember or merely seem to 
remember that P. I am not allowed to assume that I remember 
that P. Now the answer is that it is not true that memory is my 
only access to the truth of P. Today (when I am writing this) is 
Wednesday, yesterday it was Tuesday, and I have my timetable of 
lectures which confirms my belief. Besides, T can ask some of the 
students whom I think were there. Many memory based beliefs 
can be checked often by the testimony of other people or by ob- 
servation of present objects or events. 
But there are intermediate cases in which I would not say I in- 
fer that P or that I remember that P but only that I seem to re- 
member, or that it seems to me that I remember, or that I think 
I remember, that P. It is important to notice that, contrary to Fum- 
erton, these are only part of the cases where we form beliefs about 
the past. But how do we form such beliefs in these cases? Suppose 
that I seem to remember that I gave back to a friend some money 
I owed to him. It seems to me I did that while having a drink with 
him. I do not dare to say that I remember or that I know this. Do 
I form the belief that I gave the money back to my friend? It would 
be irresponsible for me to do so. The right thing to do is, maybe, 
to assign some initial probability to that proposition and to try to 
check it, or to modify such probability by investigating further. 
Maybe I try to recall what I did in the bar with more detail and 
stumble on a clear memory which confirms that proposition. Imag- 
ine I suddenly remember that another friend of mine told me: 
“Don’t you have some money for me too?”. This would be evi- 
dence that I was then giving the money back to my friend and I 
may form an inferential belief to that effect. Or maybe this vivid 
memory makes me have a clear ‘visualizing’ of the event. In the 
latter case, we have a case of remembering: I go from “I seem to 
remember that P” to “I remember that P”, but this is not an in- 
ferential step. From a certain moment on, I simply start remem- 
bering that P. My remembering the episode of my other friend 
causes me to remember what I started merely seeming to remem- 
ber, namely that I in fact gave back to my friend the money he 
had lent me. 
4. We have seen only some among a wide variety of cases of 
forming beliefs about the past on the basis of memory. As we can 
see, ‘forming beliefs about the past. on the basis of memory’ does 
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not name a uniform and unitary process. We sometimes use some 
actual evidence (the sales ticket) to infer that we did something 
or that something happened. We sometimes use something we re- 
member to  infer other things we do not remember. Other times 
we simply remember. And still other times we are caused to re- 
member, so that we suddenly start remembering what we merely 
seemed to remember. And surely more patterns could be found. 
Fumerton, however, insists on considering all beliefs about the 
past on the basis of memory inferential. This erases all the differ- 
ences we have drawn and leaves us with the unitary, uniform pat- 
tern of belief formation we are already familiar with: there is a 
certain evidence E, constituted by apparent memories that P, as 
well as an inference from E to P. If we accept the PIJ,  then in 
order to  be justified in believing P we must be justified in believ- 
ing E and also justified in believing that E makes P probable. As 
we saw, scepticism about the justification of our memory-based 
beliefs about the past is the likely result of these requirements. 
Fumerton construes a broad category of ‘beliefs about the past 
formed on the basis of memory’. How could the different cases we 
have distinguished be accommodated into a general category of 
that sort? 
If this characterization of what Fumerton has in mind is right, 
it probably, and paradoxically enough, leaves aside cases of prop- 
erly inferential beliefs about the past, for, in some cases, their 
evidential base is not an apparent memory (the sales ticket case), 
and, when it is (as in the case where I remember the words a 
friend said to me), the inference pattern is very different from 
those cases of memory-based beliefs Fumerton seems to have in 
mind. In the former, I infer, from a proposition P (‘a friend was 
telling me: “Don’t you have some money for me too?’”), a differ- 
ent proposition Q (‘I was giving some money back to my other 
friend’), whereas in the latter the object of the remembering (or 
of the seeming to remember) is the same as the object of the 
belief, namely P: I believe that P and I remember (or seem to 
remember) that P. Is it true that I infer my belief that P from 
my remembering that P? We do not think it is. Remembering 
that P is, ipso facto,  believing that P. No inferential step is in- 
volved. Maybe there is, however, an inferential step from ‘I have 
an apparent, experiential memory that PI, or from ‘I seem to 
remember that P’, to my belief that P. Is there? The fact that I 
can point to an experiential, apparent memory that P to ground 
my belief that P does not show that I infer that P from such an 
apparent memory. The source of my belief is not (or not always) 
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a premise from which I infer what I believe. It should make us 
doubt that an inference is involved the fact that the object of the 
apparent memory is the same as t,he object or content of the 
belief, for in a real inference there is at least a formal difference 
between premises and conclusion. But maybe the premise is the 
whole proposition ‘I have an apparent memory that P’ and the 
conclusion is ‘I believe that P’ (or maybe ‘P’).  What sort of in- 
ference is this? (Recall that we are not dealing with truth, but 
with justification of beliefs). There is, as it seems, a change of the 
attitude towards the proposition P, from ‘having an apparent mem- 
ory’ to ‘believing’. Now, if the ‘apparent memory’ is of the kind 
that, if true, we call ‘remembering’, it also includes ‘believing’, 
just as ‘knowing’ does. No true inferential step is involved. And if 
the ‘apparent memory’ is of the kind we would ordinarily call 
‘seeming to remember’, then, in order to change the attitude to 
‘believing’, we should try to find more evidential support for P 
(an evidential support which is not, and does not contain, P it- 
self) before coming to believe it; otherwise we will be irresponsi- 
ble or irrational. So, it appears that we simply do not do the sort 
of inference Fumerton is thinking of, namely an inference from ‘I 
have an apparent memory that P’ or ‘I seem to remember that P’ 
to ‘P’ or to ‘I believe that P’. 
Fumerton probably thinks that there is a common state of ‘seem- 
ing to remember’ both when our memories are true and when 
they are false. This is a common move in internalist, representa- 
tionalist theories of perception: truly perceiving and hallucinat- 
ing share a common core, say, a ‘seeming to perceive’, and how 
they differ is something we do not have access to. But if this is 
what lies behind his sceptical move based on the PIJ,  then we 
have scepticism in its traditional shape. Now, the common core 
thesis is no platitude; it is substantial and should be given inde- 
pendent support, for “seeming to remember” does not have here 
its ordinary meaning; it is intended to refer to a new, postulated 
kind of state. We will agree that a commitment to an analogue 
of sense data in memory is everything but uncontroversial. But 
once we make this commitment, any attempt to justify our be- 
lief that  our evidence (understood exclusively as our putative 
seemings to remember) makes P more probable than a sceptical, 
incompatible alternative is, for familiar reasons, likely to fail. Hook- 
way’s strategy, addressed to avoiding the rise of such global chal- 
lenges, would be worth exploring again in this more traditional 
setting. But this takes us too far from the paper we are com- 
menting on. 
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